Skip to content

Add THREAT_MODEL.md + AGENTS.md/SECURITY.md discoverability chain (draft for PMC review)#994

Open
potiuk wants to merge 1 commit into
apache:masterfrom
potiuk:asf-security/threat-model-2026-06-03
Open

Add THREAT_MODEL.md + AGENTS.md/SECURITY.md discoverability chain (draft for PMC review)#994
potiuk wants to merge 1 commit into
apache:masterfrom
potiuk:asf-security/threat-model-2026-06-03

Conversation

@potiuk
Copy link
Copy Markdown
Member

@potiuk potiuk commented Jun 3, 2026

This is a proposal for the Apache Ranger PMC to review — please correct, reject, or discuss as needed. The maintainers are the decision-makers; nothing here is a requirement.

This PR proposes a draft v0 threat model for Apache Ranger, plus the conventional AGENTS.md → SECURITY.md → THREAT_MODEL.md discoverability chain (Ranger currently has no SECURITY.md). Context: the ASF Security team is preparing the project for an automated agentic security scan we're piloting; such scans need the model to be mechanically discoverable, and run far less noisily when a model exists. The Security team reached out separately on the PMC's private list with the program details.

The model is written from Ranger's own public artefacts (README, ranger.apache.org, the FAQ, the public REST API docs, the repo layout) and focuses on the high-value boundaries: the policy decision/distribution path (Admin authors → plugins pull + cache), the Admin REST API, the trust placed in the per-service plugins (PEPs), and Ranger KMS.

Every claim carries a provenance tag:

  • (documented) — grounded in a Ranger doc/repo fact; cited inline. (18 claims)
  • (inferred) — the Security team's reasoning, not yet confirmed. (47 claims)

Because this is v0 with no maintainer input yet, it's mostly (inferred). Every (inferred) claim has a matching question in §14 "Open questions" (20 questions in 4 waves). The fastest path: walk §14 and reply confirm / correct / strike per line — react, don't compose. We fold your answers in and the (inferred) tags become (maintainer).

A few decisions reshape the whole model — Wave 1 especially: the no-match default (deny vs. fall-through to native ACLs), the transport-security default, and the default admin credential. Those three most determine which reports are real findings vs. by-design.

If the PMC would rather author the model yourselves, close this PR and we'll wait — this is a starting point, not an imposition.

…aft for PMC review)

Generated-by: Claude Code
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

1 participant